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PREFACE 
The suggestion for this thesis topic came from the 
author's work for the Bell Telephone Companies. The Bell 
System, a regulated utility in the public service, is con-
scious of the need for good earnings in order for it to 
fulfill its necessary functions in providing steadily improving 
service to the communicating public. 
The Bell Telephone Companies are constantly comparing 
themselves with other industries, particularly other regulated 
industries. The author has had the privilege of working with 
Mr. William Larabee, Assistant Comptroller, and Mr. George 
Krauss, General Financial Analyst, of the New York Telephone 
Company in making some of these analyses. The author is 
indebted to both for a valuable insight into the financial 
and regulatory problems faced both by the Telephone Industry 
and by other regulated industries, one of which, the Rail-
road Industry, is subject matter for this thesis. 
- v -
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Earnings of u.s. Railroads - Rates of 
Return and Operating Margins, 1905-1961 • • • • 6 
2. Earnings of all u.s. Railroads on 
3· 
Equity Capital. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10 
Railway Expenditures for Capital Improvements 
Since 1926 (Millions of Dollars) •••••• • • 35 
4· Class I Railway Operating Averages for 
1921, 1940, and 1961. • • • • • • • • • • • • • 36 
5· Spending on Research in 1954 By Association 
of American Railroads • • • • • • • • • • • • • 42 
6. Employment in Selected Industries • • • • • • • • 59 
8. 
10. 
11. 
Comparative Effects of Recessions on Total 
Employment and Railway Employment • • • . . 
Railroad Net Income and Total Dividends ••• 
Per Cent of Railway Gross Revenues Carried 
Through to Net Operating Income Before 
Taxes - Selected Railroads ••••••••• 
Net Income and Dividends as Per Cent of Book 
Value - New York Central and Chesapeake and 
Ohio Railroads ••••••••••••••• 
. . 
• • 
• • 
• • 
Per Cent Decline in Purchases by Railroads 
in Key Recession Years from Prior Years -
Selected Products • • • • • • • ••••• • • • 
- vi -
61 
63 
64 
65 
68 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
Chart 
1. Intercity Freight Traffic in the United 
States 1939-1961 ••••••••••• • • • • 52 
Employment and Compensation 1952-1961 
Class I Railroads •••••••••• • • • 
Capital Expenditures and Purchases 1952-1961 
Class I Railroads ••••••••••••• 
- vii -
• • 60 
• • 70 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
Purpose of the Study 
American Railroads are in a state of serious decline. 
This basic industry, for so long a time the most important 
industry in the nation, spans practically the whole period of 
dynamic American capitalism. The growth of the railroads is 
over and significant decline bas occurred. This industry has 
experienced great initial development, a powerfully dominant 
maturity, the onslaught of challenging competition, and a 
period of steady downtrend. 
The question for this study to explore is "why the 
decline and what lessons can other industries, particularly 
regula ted industries, learn from the plight of the railroads." 
It is my thesis that the whole range of problems 
faced by the railroads during their fall from power can be 
traced to financial difficulties and limitations. The lack 
of imagination and competitive spirit, the failure of inven-
tiveness, the freezing of product and service, the loss of 
confidence on the part of capitalist and consumer, and, 
finally, the distrust of regulating bodies and riding public -
all have roots in the inadequate financial structure and poor 
profit picture of the railroad industry over many years. 
In my view, the railroads offer an object lesson to 
other industries, particularly regulated industry, about the 
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realities of the capitalistic system. Profits must be present 
or at least attainable or else, over a period of time, in-
centive is lost and mere survival becomes the principal end. 
In addition, society itself suffers even when, through regu-
lation or other pressures, prices are held to arbitrarily low 
levels and the buying public seems to be getting a "bargain." 
In fact, the community suffers in terms of product quality, 
product development, and in terms of the industry as "good 
citizen" - that is, in the taxes it pays, the employment it 
gives, the products it buys, the obligations it assumes, etc. 
Furthermore, at a certain stage of deterioration, 
a financially weak industry produces not only a frozen product 
but an expensive product as well. Research is ignored; cost-
saving techniques are either never invented or are too ex-
pensive to develop; and unions in a declining industry become 
fearful of their jobs, such as they would not in an expanding 
industry, and resist cost-saving techniques. 
In sum, when an industry's profits are too low over 
a considerable period of time, and there are no prospects of 
improvement, the industry's performance suffers, its product 
suffers, and society suffers as a result. 
Methods Used 
The basic approach in a study of this sort must be 
historical. Since my thesis assumes that financial troubles 
besetting the railroads have been the basis of the problem, 
I intend to do an analysis of the rates of return, operating 
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margins, capital sources, etc. over a period extending back 
to around 1900. 
Since Federal and state regulations have, in great 
part, determined these several financial relationships, it 
seems important to interrelate regulation with financial 
structure and financial results. Has regulation been overly 
restrictive or not? What effect has regulation had on rail-
way earnings, on capital flow, on costs? 
Railroads have been so basic to the economy of the 
country that, inevitably, changes in the economy have meant 
changes in the situation facing the rails. The development 
of competitive forms of transportation and railway manage-
ment's reaction to such developments must be treated in 
relation to the resources of the railroads. The position of 
government in fostering competition or in helping railroads 
adapt to competition is also crucial. 
A necessary part of the thesis is to draw lessons 
for other industries from all of the other findings. How 
necessary is profit to an industry? How can regulation 
protect the public interest without stifling incentive and 
discouraging initiative? Can a regulated rate structure be 
used positively as a spur to progress? 
PART I 
FAILURE IN PROFIT - THE FINANCIAL 
PLIGHT OF THE RAILWAYS 
- 4 -
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American railroads are in difficulty. They have 
long suffered from poor earnings as the result of restrictive 
regulation, subsidized competition, management complacency, 
and earlier financial abuses - including overcapitalization 
and the resulting necessity of heavy debt financing. 
Railway Earnings as a Basis of the Problem 
Poor earnings are chronic in the industry. Even 
during the years of World War II when both freight and 
passenger traffic spurted, railroad rate of return averaged 
less than 5 per cent. Table 1 presents average rates of 
return and operating margins for several periods. From these 
figures it is apparent that railroad rates of return have 
been consistently low through the years, especially when 
compared with the earnings rates of large manufacturing 
companies, important customers of the railroads, which have 
averaged two to four times as high during these periods. 
It is significant that even before the advent of 
serious competition from other forms of transportation the 
rates of return were inadequate. It may be argued that the 
advent of newer forms of transportation served to keep rates 
of return low for the last thirty years or so. However, the 
fact is that even in the early years, 1905-1929, railroad 
profits averaged just over 4-1/2 per cent, although profits 
figures for those earlier years must be used with some 
reservati~n because of the lack of adequate depreciation 
- 6 -
accounting and the prevalence of overcapitalization at that 
time. 1 
TABLE 1 
EARNINGS OF U.S. RAILROADS - RATES OF RETURN 
AND OPERATING MARGINS, 1905-19612 
Years Average Rates of Returna 
1905-1914 • • • • • • • 5-12% 
1915-1920 • • • • • • • 3·72 
1921-1930 • • • • • • • 4-52 
1931-1940 • • . • • • • 2.30 
1941-1945 • • • • • • • 4·97 
1946-1950 • • • • • . • 3·54 
1951-1961 • • • • • • • 3·33 
Opera tin€ 
Margins 
27-3% 
16.4 
16.7 
1).9 
15-0 
9·4 
8.9 
aRatio of net railway operating income to net 
property investment. 
bRatio of net railway operating income to total 
railway operating revenues. 
lMelville Jack Ulmer, Trends and Cycles in Capital 
Formation b u.s. Railroads, 1870-1956, National Bureau of 
Econom c Research; ccas onal Paper (Washington: by the 
author, 1954), P• 47• 
Russell E. Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), P• 301. 
2For years prior to 1921: u.s., Interstate Commerce 
Commission, Annual Report on the Statistics of Railroads in 
the u.s., PP• 109-110. 
For years 1921-1959: Railroad Transportation, A 
Statistical Record (Washington: Association of American 
Railroads, Bureau of Railway Economics, 1940, 1942, 1945, 
1948, 1951, 1959). 
For years 1960-1961: u.s., Interstate Commerce 
Comndssion, Annual Re)ort on Translort Statistics in u.s., 
PP• 68, 76, 112 (1960 ; PP• 112, 1 8 (1961). 
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The Transportation Act of 1920 set a fair rate of 
return between 5-1/2 per cent and 6 per cent; in 1922, the ICC 
fixed 5·75 per cent as fair.3 Actually a return of 5-3/4 per 
cent at that time was significantly less than the returns 
being found fair for other utilities and scarcely higher than 
the market yield on railroad AAA bonds.4 Even so, down 
through the years the ICC made no effort to allow even this 
inadequate return. In 1922 the Commission ordered a rate re-
duction even though earnings were only about 3-3/4 per cent.5 
In 1925 the Commission denied the Western line haul railroads 
a rate increase on the grounds that there was no emergency.6 
Yet these railroads were earning only 4-1/4 per cent.7 The 
plignt of the railroads can be summed up in the statement 
3westmeyer, op. cit., P• 134• 
I 
143 ff. 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody 1 s Trans-
portation Manual, ed. Frank J. st.Clair (New York: 1962), 
P• a47• 
5.Miller et al., op. cit., P• 68. 
6u. s., Interstate Commerce Commission, "Advances 
in lvestern District," from Retort to the Board of Directors 
of Association of American Ra !roads on the Financial Position 
of the Railroad Industry, 113 ICC, 3, 37, 1937, P• 56. 
7Averages for the Western District for the years 
1923-1930 were obtained by telephone from Mr. H. Y. Turner, 
Bureau of Railway Economics, Association of American Rail-
roads, Washington, n.G. 
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that since World War I average railroad earnings have just 
about equaled the yield on their AAA bonds. In only two of 
the years since 1922 did the rate of return equal or exceed 
the 5· 7 5 per cent figure and in only six years did it exceed 
5 per cent. 8 
Because of consistently low profits it became increas-
ingly difficult to attract equity capital to the railroads. 
Some limited equity financing took place in the 1920's, prin-
cipally from 1927 to 1929. In the 1920's, common stock sales 
provided only about one-eighth of the funds available to 
Class I railways for construction.9 Decreased operating 
margins left the industry vulnerable to business recession 
and the depression of the 1930's completed the process that 
regulation began. Since 1930 no stocks have been issued to 
provide funds for the purchase of equipment or for additions 
and betterments.lO 
The Consequences of Poor Earnings 
The bad effects of this situation are obvious. 
Practically complete reliance on debt financing and internal 
sources of funds became necessary. The seriousness of the 
debt problem has been disguised to some extent by reductions 
8see reference 2. 
9ulmer, op. cit., P• 45· 
101-Uller et al., op. cit., P• 2.5. 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., op. cit. 
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effected by reorganization and receivership, especially during 
the 1930's. 11 The debt problem has been kept under partial 
control through the curtailment of construction and the use 
of retained earnings which were accumulated during certain 
favorable periods, particularly during World War II. 12 Divi-
dends, of course, suffered as the need for internal financing 
became more pressing. Since 1920, dividends have been in-
adequate and erratic and the percentage of railway stocks 
paying dividends has been downward.l3 In recent years, even 
the dollar amounts of dividends have been declining as the 
rate of return on capital equity has been falling. Table 2 
illustrates this point. 
Relying almost entirely on debt for outside fi-
nancing is difficult when the overall rate of earnings is 
so inadequate that the coverage of interest charges is low 
(even with the present 35 per cent debt ratio). 14 Because of 
this,railroads have been finding it increasingly difficult to 
sell any debt at all except through equipment obligations 
which are a form of underlying chattel mortgage on rolling 
llMiller et al., op. cit •. _, P• 25. 
Westmeyer, op. cit., PP• 295-296, 317 ff. 
12~., P• 699· 
13Miller et al., op. cit., PP• 10-12. 
14For debt ratios, ~_body's. Investors· Servi~e, Inc., 
op. cit., various editions. 
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stock.l5 There is, of course, an obvious limit to the 
process of issuing equipment trust obligations. More and 
more, improvements and modernization must come out of internal 
sources, that is, available working funds, depreciation 
charges and earnings. However, in the case of many roads, 
available working funds are now exhausted and earnings are 
seriously reduced or non-existent. 
TABLE 2 
EARNINGS OF ALL U.S. RAILROADS ON EQUITY CAPITAL16 
Year Return on Dividends Declared Equity (Millions of Dollars) 
1955 • • • • • • • • • 14.11% 476 
1956 • • • • • • • • • 13.81 476 
1957 • • • • • • • • • 12.38 466 
1958 • • • • • • • • • 10.81 445 
1959 • • • • • • • • • 10·47 432 
1960 • • • • • • • • • 8.21 412 
Inadequate Depreciation 
One word about depreciation - railroad managements 
have lagged behind the parade in providing adequately for 
depreciation. 17 As a result their depreciation reserves are 
15u.s. Senate, Subcommittee on Surface Trans-
portation of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
Report of April 30, 1958, P• 3• 
1~oody's Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., P• a5. 
17ulmer, op. cit., P• 47• 
Westmeyer, op. cit., P• 301. 
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only about 25 per cent of total property - a low percentage 
for a property which, in constant dollars, is about the s~ae 
today as in 1920. 18 The effect of inadequate depreciation 
rates and a low reserve on the willingness and ability to 
retire property in favor of new and more efficient plant is 
perhaps too obvious to mention. To aggravate management's 
difficulties further, Federal taxing authorities have, since 
1942, forced railroads to exclude for tax purposes 30 per 
cent of the depreciation reserves that had been accrued up 
to the year 1942· While this situation has now been changed 
by a 1958 Act of Congress and by a 1962 decision of the u.s. 
Treasury Department to allow greater depreciation rates on 
major assets, it is evident that the railroads had been 
receiving less than full tax benefit from what depreciation 
they had provided. 19 
Poor Earnings as a Deterrent to Progress 
In the traditional phases of railroading, management 
l8Figures on RR depreciation and total property 
from Association of American Railroads, op. cit. For ap-
proximate constant dollar comparisons, IGC construction cost 
index was applied to determine the relationship. 
19prom an address by Ernest s. Marsh, President, 
Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Co., October 3, 1958, 
before New York Society of Security Analysts. 
A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961 
(Washington: Association of American Railroads, Bureau of 
Railway Economics, 1962), P• 25 
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has made many and, at times, spectacular improvements in 
efficiency, but the benefits to earnings could not be re-
tained because of regulation and later because of both 
regulation and competition. 20 In those fields where inno-
vation may have been necessary to give the types of service 
which would better compete with trucks, the railroads' 
progress has been notably less successful. It has been esti-
mated that American railroads need $20 billion to modernize 
their road beds and rights of way alone. 21 The railroads 
don't have that kind of money available or in the offing. 
The average life of plant is about fifty years and the roads 
have been able to "make do" with outmoded and unattractive 
equipment.22 It is not surprising, therefore, that capital 
expenditures by the railroads in recent years have been only 
about 50 per cent to 85 per cent higher than during the 
prosperous period of the 1920's despite inflationary rises in 
labor rates and the costs of materials used by the railroads.23 
Particularly in the past five years an active rail-
road management has had some success in attacking its prob-
2C1-riller et al., op. cit., PP• 127-128. 
21From an address by Hon. Richard F. Mitchell, 
Chairman, ICC, November 18, 1954· 
22ulmer, op. cit., P• 48. 
2JFigures for capital expenditures obtained from 
u.s., ICC, Annual Re ort on Tr~ns ort Statistics in u.s. 
Individual years f • were compared with average ex-
penditures for years 1921-29. 
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lams. There have been signs of vigorous application of 
business methods to railroading; management has been able to 
arouse public concern - and even some public sympathy for 
railroad problems; the railroads 1 frankness in Congressional 
hearings had a favorable result in the passage of the Trans-
portation Act of 1958 and the repeal of the 3 per cent excise 
tax - both of which are alleviating some of the railroad 
problems. However, a long-term solution depends on a reali-
zation that inadequate earnings have resulted in inadequate 
service and lost traffic. This conclusion does not rest on 
hindsight. Professor William z. Ripley of Harvard University 
recognized as far back as 1915 that railroads would suffer 
eventually if rates of return continued too low. He said, 
Now firmly established in power, both by national 
legislation and interpretation by the highest courts 
in the land, the next step for the public in the 
development of sound government policy should be a 
frank recognition of the need of an ample return to 
private capital. Any other course is bound to hamper 
development.24 
dauses of Poor Earnings 
Failures of Government and Management 
Direct governmental regulation of railroad rates 
has been the prime cause of low earnings but other factors 
have contributed. At times management has been guilty of 
ill-advised expansion, failure to achieve maximum economy, 
24william Zebina Ripley, Railroads, Finance and 
Or§anization (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915), p. 
32 • 
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an apparent unwillingness to look at transportation from the 
shippers• point of view, and lack of alertness to the possi-
bilities of the newer forms of transportation. 25 However, 
granting the responsibility of management for part of present 
difficulties, it must be conceded that many of its problems 
were beyond its control. First, because of restrictive 
regulation and possibly also because the public felt the 
railroads were big and wicked, the industry has been unable 
to attract the type of management personnel that was needed 
to give it a fighting chance to survive and become successful.26 
Depression, Labor, and Public Hostility 
The Great Depression seriously aggravated an already 
weak financial structure and just at this time a transpor-
tation revolution was taking place, taking traffic and 
revenues from the railroads. 27 Labor problems, too, have 
been burdensome, although often historically of the rail-
roads• own making. Rigid seniority rules, outmoded union 
operating rules, and widespread feather-bedding have hindered 
management in the efficient use of labor and equipment. 28 
25charles L. Dearing and Wilfred Owen, National 
Transportation Policy (The Brookings Institution, 1949), P• 351. 
26westmeyer, op. cit., PP• 700-701. 
"Special Report on the Railroads," Business Week, 
July 13, 1957, P• 104. 
27Kent Tenney Healy, The Economics of Transportation 
in America (Ne<rJ York: The Ronald Press, 1940), P• 517. 
l{e stmeyer, op. cit., P• 699. 
28rbid., PP• 258-263• 
- 1.5 -
Finally, difficulties for the railroads were created by 
government policy and regulation in addition to and apart from 
the direct regulation of rates. Many of thsse difficulties 
have persisted down through the years partly because they 
reflect basic governmental and public attitudes toward 
regulated industry - particularly the railroads. As Senator 
Smathers once said, " • • • politically speaking they (the 
railroads) are about as popular as a nest of red ants at a 
lawn party.n29 This public attitude of antagonism toward 
the railroads is historic. In the early days high and dis-
criminatory freight rates, financial manipulation, corruption 
of public servants, pools, and the occasionally arrogant 
approach of railroad management in its dealings with customers 
all served to engender public wariness and later to cement 
public hostility towards the railroads.30 
Oftentimes such hostility still largely overshadows, 
in the public's mind, the ttgood citizenship" aspects of the 
railroads' operations. The rails are still a major source 
of employment, providing over 700,000 jobs throughout the 
country in 1961 with a payroll of $4.6 billion.31 The rail-
road tax bill is high - especially property taxes paid to 
29rn a speech before the Traffic Club of New York, 
May 13, 19,58. 
30westmeyer, op. cit., P• 698. 
14-1.5. 
31A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, PP• 
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local communities.32 Their expenditures for equipment, 
buildings, and maintenance (although declining) are a source 
of business to other industries and are a contributor to the 
nation's economy.33 
Lagging Regulations and Regulation Lag 
The most obvious and direct governmental influences 
on railway activity are regulations under the Interstate 
Commerce Act and similar acts in the several states. :Hany 
regulatory policies were devised to meet monopoly situations 
no longer extant and only serve now to limit railroad flexi-
bility. Sometimes, too, there are discrepancies between 
expressions of policy and actual practice of regulatory 
bodies, as in the case of rate regulation. 
Regulatory lag, too, has hurt the financial position 
of the railroads. While it is true that questions of rate 
changes are .complex matters requiring lengthy and careful 
consideration, even the most needed and obvious rate adjust-
ments have taken months and even years. For example, the 
early post World War II wage increases each took about a year 
to be translated into rate increases.34 Regulatory lag can 
be cut down or eliminated completely if there is sufficient 
pressure or commission awareness of the problem. The prompt 
32~., PP• 22-24• 
33Ibid., PP• 24-28. 
34nearing and Owen, op. cit., PP• 278 ff. 
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action of the New York Public Service Commission, in granting 
the Long Island Rail Road a passenger fare increase in the 
spring of 1958, is a case in point.35 
In several other ways, too, government or its 
various agencies have erected barriers to rail flexibility. 
These include an inflexible rate structure, more generous 
(and expensive) retirement benefits legally required for 
railroad workers than for industrial workers generally, the 
reluctance of regulatory commissions to consider "inherent 
advantage" when setting rail rates, and the hesitancy of 
state bodies to grant increases in intrastate rates com-
mensurate with interstate increases along the same lines. 
Regulatory Restrictions on Railroads 
Several provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act 
and other acts serve to limit railroad flexibility. These 
include: 
1. The ttlong and short haul" restriction on 
railroads, under which it is unlawful for a common 
carrier to charge more in the aggregate for a shorter 
than for a longer haul. Non-regulated·competing6car-riers on highways are not similarly restricted.; 
2. The Transportation Act of 1940 requires that 
the ICC consider the effect of rate changes only on the 
traffic volume of the carrier in question. The Com-
35New York Times, April 4, 1958, P• 1. 
36nearing and Owen, op. cit., PP• 231, 259· 
u.s., IGC, Interstate Commerce Acts Annotated, 
Vol. II, Sec. 4, P• 9163• 
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mission interprets this to mean that no carrier shall 
be required to maintain rates to protect the traffic of 
another carrier if the rates in question would be un-
reasonable by other standards. Since this is a matter 
of judgment and since specific cost analyses are so dif-
ficult, railroad rates in fact have provided an "umbrella" 
over the rates of competing carriers. The new 1958 
Transportation Act again specifies that rates for one 
form of transport "shall not be held up to a particular 
level" to protect the tariff of any other, but there is 
doubt whethe~ the practical effect on ICC policy will be 
noticeable.31 
3· The requirement that common farm con~odities 
be subject to rate regulation when carried by common 
carriers but free from regulation when carried on "exempttt 
trucks. The number of such "exempt" vehicles has ex-
panded to such a degree that large amounts of railway 
freight are diverted to these regulation-free carriers. 
The Transportation Act of 1958 restored several cate-
gories of foodstuffs to the regulated list - including 
frozen fruits and vegetables, cocoa, beans, bananas, 
canned fish, and wool. Howexer, the basic patterns of 
exemption remain unaltered.3~ 
4• Prohibitions against railroads' entering other 
forms of transportation activity. In the long term, the 
railroads gradually ceased to be monopolies and yet were 
denied the freedom to compete on equal terms with others 
for the transportation market. Restrictions are partly 
legal and partly administrative: 
a) The Panama Canal Act of 1912 contained a 
specific prohibition against any railroad owning or 
controlling a common carrier by water with which it 
37westmeyer, op. cit., P• 164. 
Dearing and Owen, op. cit., P• 363. 
E. T. Thompson, "What Hope f'or the Railroads," 
Fortune, February 1958, P• 139· 
New York Times, l"lay 31, 1958, P• 33· 
38Talk by Hon. Richard F. Mitchell, Chairman, 
ICC, November 18, 1954• 
Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1958. 
New York Times, loc. cit. 
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competed or might compete, although some exceptions 
were allowed under ICC discretion.39 
b) The law permits combined rail-motor trans-
port operations on a showing that the proposed opera-
tion will be consistent with the public interest and 
that the rail carrier can use motor vehicle service 
to public advantage. Even where approval has been 
obtained, it has been, at times at least, so encmabered 
with restrictions that combined operations were not 
economical. For example, the Santa Fe some time ago 
obtained regulatory approval to acquire certain 
trucking facilities in the Southwest. The approval, 
however, was so restricted, as to the number of key 
poin·t s for example, that the railroad decided against 
the acquisition. The possible benefits to the shipper 
seem to be thought secondary to the hazards of 
''destructive competitiontt with motor carriers.40 
c) The Civil Aeronautics Board has for all 
practical purposes excluded surface carr~ers from 
any participation in air transportation.41 
5· The requirement that railroads must obtain 
regulatory approval before discontinuing service. Some 
such provision is necessary, but it has been administered 
by commissions, particularly state commissions, in such 
a way as to burden railroads with unprofitable business 
for inordinately long periods of time.42 
Government Aid to Railroad Competitors 
Government not only hampers the railroad industry 
through regulation on the one hand but it fosters competing 
forms of transportation on the other hand through subsidy. 
Highways have been provided for the trucking industry. 
39westmeyer, op. cit., P• 126. 
40Ibid. , p • 419. 
4lnearing and Owen, op. cit., P• 309. 
42Harvin L· Fair and Ernest w. Williams, Jr., 
Economics of Transportation {New York: Harper & Bros., 
1950), P• 739· 
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High air mail rates and provision of terminal facilities have 
supported a growing airways business. Federal appropriations 
have been used to improve waterways.43 User charges and taxes 
are often well below the full cost of the service provided. 
It is true, of course, that such alternate forms of trans-
portation are often of great benefit to the public and 
generally promote the social good. However, the effect on 
the railroads is adverse, undeniably. Rail traffic is lost; 
fixed charges remain high; and railroad taxes pay some portion 
of the subsidies used to promote rail competitors. As an 
example of the latter inequity, taxes on the New York Central's 
passenger station in Albany in one recent year were $59,904, 
more than equaling the operating loss of $57,784 on the city-
owned airport.44 
At times, too, certain of the ICC regulations have 
served to hinder the competitive positions of particular 
railroads to the detriment of both the railroads involved 
and the communities served by those railroads. One example 
of this is the higher commodity rates set for hauling by 
rail from Western points to New York and Boston than to 
Baltimore and Philadelphia. These higher rates were set 
43Association of American Railroads, The High Cost 
of Conflicting Public Transportation Policies (Washington: 
19SO), PP• 32 ff· 
44nThe Dying Passenger Train," u.s. News and World 
Report, October 3, 1958, P• 38. 
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originally to offset lower trans-Atlantic rates from the two 
Northern ports. Since then the ocean rates have been equalized 
but the rail differentials remain, an instance of how historic 
conditions often change while regulations to meet those out-
dated conditions stay the same. In this particular case, of 
course, the railroads complain of lost traffic, tbe ports of 
lost shipping, and local communities of lost jobs and business. 
In February of 1962 a three-judge Federal Court ruled that New 
York and Boston should be given relief from these discrimi-
natory rail rates, but other ports are, naturally, appealing 
this far-reaching decision. However, the damage is already 
done, and both ports have lost extensive traffic over the 
years.45 
Taxes and Their Effect on Rail Finances 
Taxes are a heavy drain on railroad finances and 
are much higher than on other forms of transport. They 
include the usual Federal and state corporate taxes and heavy 
local taxes that apply to all business, but which hit the 
railroads particularly hard because of their large amounts of 
taxable property.46 For example, New York City's special 
45Telephone conversation with 1-lr. Nathan Cherniak, 
N.Y. Port Authority. 
Boston Herald, February 17, 1962, PP• 1-2. 
46The High Cost of Conflicting Public Transportation 
Policies, PP• 23-27. ----
Chase Manhattan Bank, Transportation Investment 
Forum, December 13, 1957, as reported in a pamphlet by the 
same title, P• 22. 
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franchise tax cost the New York Central Railroad $3,037,529 
in fiscal 1957-58. The franchise tax is levied on the right 
to use city property, such as right of way, and is exclusive 
of city taxes on real property owned by the railroads, such 
as Grand Central Station.47 
To illustrate the relative tax burdens on the 
several forms of transportation: in 1960 payments (including 
income and payroll taxes) by motor common carriers of general 
freight amounted to 8sf per dollar of revenue vs. 14.9sf for 
motor carriers of passengers, 4¢ for domestic airlines, 5$i 
for Glass A & B water carriers, and 28sf for railroads. In 
addition, it costs the railroads 20¢ out of every dollar of 
revenue for owning and maintaining their right of way vs. 
5$i in fuel taxes and license fees for carriers of freight, 
and 6sf for carriers of passengers.48 
The Government as Customer 
Government, which is perhaps the largest single 
customer of the railroads, has wrung important financial 
concessions out of the railroads. There are mandatory dis-
counts for defense and other government shipments by rail.49 
47New York Times, June 16, 1962. 
48Mr. G. A. Pounds, Statistician, Bureau of Rail-
way Economics, Association of American Railroads, in a tele-
phone conversation. His source was the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 
49Richard F· Nitchell, as cited note 38. 
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Mail rates are insufficient to cover railroad expenses and 
capital costs in transporting the mail. The ICC has the power 
to determine fair and reasonable rates to be paid by the Post 
Office Department. However, the railroads are obliged to 
transport all mail offered on the train requested but the Post 
Office Department is not required to guarantee any volume of 
mail. . This makes for uncertain and inefficient mail operations 
on the railroads.50 The fCC in 1958 authorized increases 
averaging 39 per cent in mail rates in the Eastern district. 
These are maximum rates.51 Even if the railroads concerned 
carried all mail at the maximum and made no concessions to 
meet competition they would make no more than 3 per cent on 
the capital allocated to this operation. The Post Office 
opposed even these confiscatory rates. 
The Rate Structure as Part of the Problem 
Rate structures are rigid and are not adjusted to 
give the railroads the full benefit of their competitive ad-
vantages on the one hand or full compensatory rates on the 
other. For this, railroad management must take a large share 
of responsibility. Railroads do not know their costs of 
handling the various kinds of freight and have not been in a 
5°westmeyer, op. cit., P• 669. 
5lu.s., ICC, Rate Decision, No. 9200, Railwa~ Mail 
Pay Application of Eastern Railroads, 1956, June 23, 1 58. 
New York Times, June 27, 1958. 
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position to propose the most effective rate schedules.52 
Cost determination by commodities or classes of freight has 
its dangers because shippers can fight individual rates if 
the rate of return seems too high. Perhaps a clear legis-
lative mandate is required that railroads can make their money 
where they can provided the overall rate of return is reasonable. 
The tendency for government to argue that different classes 
of service earn the same rate of return, or no more than a 
"fair" rate of return in each instance, could effectively 
wreck a comprehensive and sensible revision of rate making 
philosophy by the railroads. 
Passenger Traffic 
In the post-war years, particularly, the railroads' 
precarious financial balance has been upset by persistent and 
growing losses on passenger travel. These losses are espe-
cially apparent in periods of recession when freight car 
loadings drop off and freight revenues are even less able 
than usual to absorb passenger deficits. Howard rtosmer, an 
ICC official who completed a year-long investigation into 
railroad passenger service, reports that passenger losses are 
real and heavy - ranging from $508 million to $723 million 
annually during the eight years from 1948 through 1955 that 
he studied. 
The biggest factor in declining rail travel is the 
52Thompson, loc. cit., P• 148. 
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private automobile, aided by modern highways that make auto 
travel quicker and more pleasant and train riding thereby less 
attractive. The airplane has also cut deeply into rail traval. 
Airlines have subsidies too - air mail subsidies from the 
Federal government and local subsidies through provision of 
terminal facilities and runways. The obvious answer in most 
cases has been abandonment or cuts in passenger service, but 
commissions are reluctant to allow such cuts due to local 
pressures. The result has often been years of burdensome 
losses that have hindered improvements in freight service, 
the real area of railroad contribution to the cammunity todayl3 
The Plight of u.s. Railroads - A Summary 
In summary, one thing appears clear - the ground-
work for much of the trouble that later beset the railroads 
was laid prior to 19)0. For this, government policy and 
regulation must bear a heavy part of the responsibility. 
Basically this results from the assumption by practically 
everybody concerned that the railroads were strong and mono-
polistic. From the advent of effective rate regulation in 
1906 the financial position of railroads almost progressively 
deteriorated. 
Another factor has been the inflexibility of the 
railroad industry and its apparent inability to change with 
53 11 The Dying Passenger Train, tt loc. cit. 
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the times. Regulators and management alike seemed bemused 
with the concept of railroad transportation in the tradi-
tional sense. Management fought or ignored growing compe-
tition instead of learning how to live with it and continued 
in the business of railroading in the same old way. Research 
and innovation were usually inadequate. Experimentation with 
various types of service was discouraged by the difficulty 
of getting regulatory approval to discontinue service ex-
periments which prove unprofitable. Regulators threw road-
blocks in the path of management in whatever attempts may 
have been made in adapting to changing conditions. 
Underlying this whole situation was the inability 
to gat all the capital that would have been needed to do the 
job correctly. The railroads entered the depression with in-
adequate operating margins, low financial reserves, and out-
moded concepts. The result was inevitable. 
The tragic thing is that for the last three decades, 
until the last five years, little has been done about it 
except for dieselization and greatly improved efficiency in 
the traditional railroad operations. The present state of 
railroad earnings, equipment, service, and competitive 
position opens the way for and calls once again for govern-
ment ownership on the grounds that "private capital cannot 
do the necessary job." 'rhe President of the Bangor and 
Aroostook Railroad warned, as late as November, 1962, that 
never in the long history of the American railroad industry 
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has the industry been so precariously balanced between a 
long and permanent decline and government ownership. Mr. 
Strout advocates, as a radical solution, rail independence 
of ICC control over minimum rates on shipments of agricultural 
and bulk commodities. This, he thinks, would restore to 
the railroads freedom from regulating lag which hinders their 
taking full measure of their inherent competitive advantages.54 
Along the same line of thinking, John W• Barriger, President 
of the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad, states that the 
railroads would develop a system of "super-railroads," pro-
viding two-hour service from Boston to Chicago, if the govern-
ment would loosen controls over mergers, rate-setting, and 
labor work rules. This, he states, would give the rails 
needed "elbow-room" to take advantage of inherent superiority 
along certain areas of transportation.55 
54Boston Herald, November 30, 1962, p. 29. 
55Boston Globe, January 11, 1963, PP• 1, 6. 
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Without adequate financial resources an industry can 
employ only makeshift solutions, even when problems are re-
cognized. In the railroads' case, however, financial consid-
erations have been so overriding with railway management that 
opportunity for long range planning for broad changes in 
transportation methods has been severely limited. Management 
efforts, of necessity, have been focused on short range, 
small cost projects producing immediate savings. 
Insufficient Emphasis on Service 
The great concern of the railways in recent years 
has been with the adverse effects of regulation and govern-
ment policy on their ability to compete with other forms of 
passenger and freight transportation. Some of them have 
complained that inherent advantages of rail transportation 
go largely unrecognized by the ICC, that rail rates are held 
as an 11 tunbrella" of protection over other carriers, and that 
it is difficult to make selective commodity rate adjustments 
in those areas, both product and geographic, of most in-
tensive competition among the different carriers. 
These are difficulties the railroads do face. 1 
However, there are those rail authorities who claim that this 
emphasis on rates is not the most important competitive prob-
lem faced by the railroads. Mr. Anthony Arpaia, a former 
member of the ICC, points out that the greatest proportion 
lAs discussed in Part I of this thesis. 
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of the traffic not carried by the rails is going to exempt 
and private carriage, despite the significant fact that rail 
rates are generally lower than motor rates, at least in terms 
of aggregate revenues per ton-miles hauled. His conclusion 
is that price is not the only attraction to shippers. In his 
opinion, shippers are interested in two things besides price. 
These are: (a) specialized or better service, and (b) less 
total overall costs to certain classes of shippers in spite 
of higher rates, to be obtained through lower inventories, 
less handling, and fewer loss and damage claims. As one 
solution, he would eliminate the present system of charges 
imposed on contents of a shipment under which there are 
widely varying rates for different types of merchandise. He 
proposes a new classification based on cubic measurement. 
A shipper would pay a single rate for the amount he shipped 
rather than the type of good he shipped, thereby simplifying 
the rate structure, billing procedures, and handling problems. 2 
Mr. Arpaia's opinion about service apparently is 
supported by increasing numbers of railway people themselves, 
including Patrick McGinnis of the Boston and Maine Railroad 
who has stated that "every time we lose a shipper to a contract 
2From an address by Anthony Arpaia, Interstate 
Commerce Commission, entitled, "Railroads: Their Future," 
as reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, March 21, 
1957, PP• 6, 26-27• 
Boston Globe, September JO, 1962, P• A37• 
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carrier, despite the fact that it is unfair, and even when we 
lose him to his own trucks, it is usually due to service, not 
rates."3 
The Effects of Competition 
A railroad, under the common law governing common 
carriers of goods, must accept all goods offered to it of the 
type it professes to carry. Early regulation, in fact, 
existed to assure that this service would be available,to all 
in adequate amount, over the routes desired, and without dis-
crimination.4 There are, however, no legal requirements that 
shippers use any particular common carrier. There was a time, 
of course, when a shipper had no real choice; he had to use 
the railroad. In those years when railroads had a near-
monopoly on transportation, the shipper at times had to endure 
unsatisfactory service. At times there has been inadequate 
provision of basic equipment needs, and car shortages have 
been frequent. In the earlier days there was nothing the 
shipper could do about it except apply pressure for improve-
ment. As a result, businessmen suffered severe losses, men 
were thrown out of work, and the public was plagued by periodic 
shortages of goods.5 The railroads are still finding it 
3From an address by Patrick McGinnis, President, 
Boston and Maine Railroad, entitled, "Radical Cures for Rail-
road Ills," as reported in the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, November 7, 1957, P• 9. 
4westmeyer, op. cit., P• 324. 
5Ibid., P• 326. 
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impossible to provide at all times enough up-to-date and at-
tractive equipment to meet modern transportation needs -
mainly because of poor earnings, but today there is a new 
transportation situation. 6 Shippers and passengers have 
alternatives. They can go, and have gone, to the railroads' 
competitors. Now the railroads are faced with a difficult 
fight to regain traffic long since lost to other carriers, 
and inadequate profits are hindering the rails in that fight.7 
Quality of Service 
Freight service offered by railroads today has been 
characterized as slow and inflexible. The characterization 
may be valid if railroad service is to be judged by present-
day standards of shippers' needs and alternative choices 
rather than those of two generations ago. 
Speed of service is measured by the time it takes 
to move a consignment from the shipper's door to its final 
destination and not by the speed of a freight train. One 
railroad, 
favorable 
a shipper 
in Kansas 
for example, had 
circumstances it 
in St. Louis to 
City. 8 This is 
6Ibid., P• 298. 
7rbid., P• 700. 
estimated that even under the most 
takes 24 hours to move a car from 
its destination some 300 miles away 
equivalent to only 12 miles per 
8T. s. Schafers and L. Kohlmeier, "Equipment and 
Service Need l1odernization," st. Louis, Globe-Democrat, 
March 21, 1958, part of a series entitled, "What's Wrecking 
the Railroads?" 
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hour. A truck can perform this service in less than one-half 
the time. What is wrong? The average freight car today 
travels less than 50 miles in 24 hours because for more than 
21 hours each day it is standing somewhere, losing time in a 
freight yard or terminal. 9 Train speed is effective, there-
fore, for less than 3 out of 24 hours each day. 
On the average, railroads load over thirty-four 
tons to a freight car and more than 1,700 tons to a freight 
train. 10 This has some obvious service and cost advantages 
but it also can lead to even greater inflexibility than pre-
viously. It could mean longer waits in accumulating suf-
ficient freight requiring shipment along a particular rail 
line. It could mean more time lost in loading and unloading 
individual cars. 
Old box cars which make up a large proportion of 
the railroads' freight fleet mean poor service.l1 They take 
longer to load and unload than certain types of modern cars 
and since they are not well designed to carry certain types 
of freight they frequently contribute to damaged goods. Each 
year the railroads pay out millions of dollars in freight 
losses and damage claims. 12 Even aside from the financial 
9Ibid. 
lOA Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, PP• 28-29. 
11schafers and Kohlmeier, loc. cit., P• 6. 
12Ibid. 
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drain that this entails, it means shipper dissatisfaction and 
potential loss of traffic to competitors. 
A member of the Committee on Materials Handling of 
the National Retail Lumber Dealers Association has this to 
say about freight service afforded by the railroads: 
It is our belief that railroads in general do not give 
proper recognition to the problems of their customers. 
Basically, transportation consists of loading, con-
veying, and unloading. Unless the railroads have the 
proper equipment, the customer is unable to use the 
labor-savi~g equipment available today for loading and 
unloading • .3 
Efforts of the Railways to Improve Service 
What have the railroads been doing to improve ser-
vice? A widely held opinion has it that they are doing very 
little, an opinion which arises largely from people's ex-
perience with commuting and other passenger travel. 14 In 
fact, the railroads have spent large sums on improvements and 
innovations in the traditional J:?.hases of railroading. These 
expenditures have been relatively heavy, considering the poor 
earnings of the railways and the difficulties they experience 
in raising capital. 
It is evident from Table 3 that sharp increases in 
spending for capital improvements took place in the years fol-
lowing World War II. However, after adjustment by the Whole-
13st. Louis Globe-Democrat, March 30, 1958, P• 3F· 
14Miller et al., op. cit., P• 127. 
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sale Price Index for the rapid price increases of that period 
(as indicated in the final column of the table) post-war 
spending shows up as less than during the late 1920's despite 
an increase in ton-miles of freight handled. It becomes even 
less impressive when it is realized how little was spent 
during the periods of the depression and World War II and how 
large a backlog of equipment and maintenance needs accumulated 
during those periods. Without the abnormally heavy traffic 
and improved earnings of the war period the railroads would 
not have had the money to do as much as they did. 15 
TABLE 3 
RAILWAY EXPENDITURES FOR CAPITAL IMPROVEV~NTs16 
SINCE 1926 {MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
Roadway Total Adjusted for Price Period Equipment and Total Changes (1961) Structures (Dollars) 
1926-30 Avg. 307 505 812 $1,575 
1931-40 Avg. 130 147 277 670 
1941-45 Avg. 323 208 531 977 
1946-55 Avg. 747 335 p_,o82 1,244 
1956-60 Avg. 702 318 1,020 1,030 
1961 427 219 646 646 
Railroad Success in Improving Operating Efficiency 
The most spectacular improvement in traditional 
15westmeyer, op. cit., PP• 169, 699· 
16Moody 1 s Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., P• a 11. 
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railroading has, of course, been the dieselization of loco-
motive equipment. Since 1946 American railroads have shifted 
from steam-driven to diesel-driven propulsion.l7 For their 
efforts the rails have obtained more efficient engines in 
terms of tractive power, expense of operation, and cleanli-
ness.l8 Of even wider implication is the aid these improved 
locomotives have given the railroads in their campaigns to 
increase average train speeds, average locomotive and car 
mileage, tons carried, and cars carried per train. vJithout 
the post-World vlar II dieselization programs, railroads 
would not have managed to earn even the small rates of return 
in evidence since the war.l9 
1. 
2. 
3· 
4· 
TABLE 4· 
CLASS I RAILWAY OPERATING AVERAGES FOR 
1921, 1940, AND 196120 
1921 1940 
Daily net ton-miles -
per serviceable 
448 freight car 664 
Freight train load -
tons 651 849 
Freight train speed -
J.VIPH 11.5 16.7 
Net ton-miles per 
freight train hour 7,506 14,028 
1961 
990 
1,508 
19.9 
29,685 
17A Review of Railroad Qperations in 1961, op. cit., 
P• 27· 
l~iller et al., op. cit., PP• 127-129. 
19Ibid. 
20Railroad Transportation, A Statistical Record, 
op. cit., P• 10. 
Moody's Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., PP• a6, 
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That the railroads have been successful over the 
years in terms of these operating goals is evident from Table 
4• Credit for this substantial progress is due to the steady 
improvement in plant and equipment, to technological research, 
and to the managements that have taken necessary measures to 
effect improvements. 
Examples of Technological Advance 
Operating efficiency itself contributes to better 
service for the customer. Faster trains, heavier loads, 
smaller damage losses, and fewer locomotive breakdowns 
naturally mean more efficient service to the customer, al-
though it is gradual and not readily apparent to him. Re-
search and development have played their parts in all of 
this. Among these improvements could be included the coded 
track circuit which has extended the range, flexibility, and 
usefulness of automatic block signals; centralized traffic 
control which enables a single-track line to carry almost as 
much traffic as double-track lines at a lower cost; improve-
ments in metallurgy, manufacturing processes, design and 
welding have added at least 50 per cent more service life to 
steel rail while cutting its breakage by three-quarters. 
Elimination of grades and curves, strengthening of bridges, 
and respacing of signals all have made their contributions 
to moving more freight further and quicker and at less cost.21 
21Association of ~~erican Railroads, The High Cost 
of Conflicting Public Transportation Policies (Washington: 
1951), PP• 12-13. 
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Installations of New Rolling Stock 
During the ten-year period 1952-61 an average of 
about 50,000 new freight cars were added annually or about 
3 per cent of total cars in service. 22 At face value freight 
car purchases would seem to be adequate and perhaps even 
impressive, in numbers, even if not in type or function. 
However, the railroads' inventory of freight cars has not been 
modernized in the way the old steam locomotives were replaced. 
Most of the new box cars are basically the same as the old.23 
All-purpose tank cars, new functional box cars, and special 
design cars have been developed, but there have never been 
enough of them purchased by enough railroads to provide an 
adequate supply to meet the changing demands of shippers. 
tack of money was probably one good reason. Another reason 
was the lack of universal decision by all railroads to buy 
new-style box cars to insure that one railroad would not be 
supplying other railroads with modern equipment without 
gaining similar benefits themselves. 24 The difficulty in 
getting return trip use of specialized types of cars is, of 
course, also a legitimate deterrent to their purchase. 
The average age of all railway cars approximates 
22As computed from figures obtained from A Review 
of Railroad Operations in 1961, p. 2. 
23schafers and Kohlmeier, loc. cit. 
24nspecial Report on the Railroads," loc. cit., 
P• 103. 
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thirty years and about one-third of freight cars exceeds 
twenty-five years of age. In the light of this situation 
purchases appear as bare minimum requirements unlikely to 
dent the general freight car obsolescence. 25 Shippers object 
to aged freight cars because of more frequent damage to 
freight and because the cars are often not of the specifi-
cations desired. 
Railroad managements today are much aware of this 
situation and in individual instances, at least, are taking 
steps to prevent further deterioration. Recently, the Chicago 
and North Western, despite a shortage of capital funds, 
ordered 1,000 new freight cars - a foresighted operation 
because the road is building for the future and obtained an 
unusually favorable price from the manufacturer who was 
anxious to keep his manufacturing plant open. 
Present Emphasis on Operating Efficiency 
for Financial Reasons 
The statistics cited above suggest that the rail-
roads have been emphasizing Operating efficiency - the kind 
that is more in~ediately apparent on the income statement 
than in the minds of shippers. Improvements in operating 
efficiency have been of considerable importance in preventing 
a financial collapse, but the railroads have been engaged for 
years in a basic competitive fight on the basis of service. 
25schafers and Kohlmeier, loc. cit. 
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They have been losing this fight in important areas. Their 
dilemma has been the need for financial survival on the one 
hand and the necessity to take vigorous, and perhaps costly, 
measures to meet growing competition on the other hand. 
Earnings have been so consistently low that no money is 
available for the calculated risk, for the innovation that 
may prove a failure but may save millions, for the innovation 
that will be temporarily inefficient but could mean extra-
ordinary savings in the long run. 
Is Present Research Adequate? 
These are advances along the lines of traditional 
railroading. However, much of the improvement has been rather 
recent and many long-standing (and expensive) operating 11bugs 11 
have yet to be eliminated. Delays and derailments still 
result from the so-called hot box; a reliable coupler with 
built-in air hose is yet undeveloped; car shortages still 
arise.26 
It is questionable whether enough railroad money 
is going into research. Many organizations are engaged in 
research. Some of the individual railroads do their own 
experimenting. 'l'he Santa Fe Railroad, for example, has 
developed its ow.n shock-proof freight car, designed to 
26nRailroad Accomplishments of Recent Years," 
Railway Age, April 15, 1957, P• 46• 
- 41 -
minimize damage.27 Other work is done by manufacturers of 
railroad equipment to improve their own products. Specific 
projects have been farmed out by the Association of American 
Railroads to such organizations as the Armour Research 
Foundation of the Franklin Institute (research on hot boxes) 
and General Hotors in cooperation with the Wrought Steel 
Wheel Industry (wheel stresses). 28 However, the Association 
of American Railroads itself is the only organization that is 
presently equipped to attack the wider problems of service. 
The other agencies can make valuable contributions along 
specific lines, but in most oases they are concerned them-
selves with their own profits and cost problems. Also, these 
other organizations are unregulated and can have some assurance 
of retaining the profits of successful innovation, an assurance 
tbe railroads do not have as an incentive for their in-
novations. 
During one fairly recent year (1954) the research 
laboratories of the AAR in Chicago had less than $400,000 
available for experimenting, while Bell Telephone Laboratories 
had $100 million available in that same year for research to 
benefit the telephone industry. By 1962, AAR laboratories 
27nspecial Report on the Railroads," loc. oi t., p. 103. 
Shock Control, a release by Santa Fe Railroad 
(no date). 
28Railway Age, February 15, 1954, P• 24. 
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had a million dollars to spend on research, which is still 
relatively insignificant.29 The following table gives a 
breakdown of the AAR's research expenditures for the year 
1954: 30 
TABLE 5 
SPENDING ON RESEARCH IN 1954 BY 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS 
Item 
Committee on rail 
Committee on track 
Relation between track and 
equipment 
Committee on roadway and 
ballast 
Committee on ties 
Structural projects (bridge impact, 
stress, paint, etc.) 
Administration 
Total 
Amount 
$ 69,862 
52,330 
15,4.50 
47,260 
12,000 
157,095 
33,310 
$390,307 
When the $390,000 is broken down, it becomes evident how small 
have been the amounts of money devoted to the several areas 
of study. The railroads have been suffering a *400 million 
loss annually from the effects of rust on their plant and 
equipment, so that $400,000 or more spent on this problem 
29The figure for Bell Telephone Laboratories 
obtained from article, "Bell Laboratories," Business Week, 
February 6, 1954· 
The 1962 figure on AAR research from speech by 
vl. M. Keller, v.p. - Research, AAR, in Railroad Locomotives 
and Cars, July 1962, P• 24. 
30Railway Age, February 1.5, 19.54, P• 24· 
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alone might not be unreasonable.31 Past experimentation has 
resulted in tripling the life of railway cross-ties; yet in 
1954 only $12,000 was devoted to research on ties. Sue-
cessful research cannot be specifically translated in terms 
of money, but there are minimum sums which are necessary for 
an effective research job. 
Expensive Duplication 
A difficulty in developing new equipment is the fre-
quent lack of cooperation and coordination on equipment stand-
ards among the railroads. At present there are several dif-
ferent tie-down devices for "piggy-back" cars.32 Perhaps some 
of these devices meet a special need of an individual railroad 
or shipper, or perhaps in some cases they are employed for 
understandable competitive reasons. On the other hand, they 
may simply represent needless duplication of effort based on 
parochialism and lack of cooperation. The advantages of 
standardization are axiomatic. Despite the expenditure of 
$15.6 billion since the war on new plant and equipment, it was 
estimated back in 1958 that $20 billion of modernization was 
then required. Since that time, only $2.4 billion of the 
estimated ~20 billion has been spent.33 With the difficulties 
3lrbid., August 19, 1957, P• 58. 
32p. A. lVlcGinnis, Railway Age, October 21, 1957 
33Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, Yearbook 
of Railroad Information (Washington: by the Conference, 1958), 
P• 16. 
Ivioody' s Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., P• a 11. 
Schafers and Kohlmeier, loc. cit. 
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railroads face in raising funds, any d~lication of effort 
seems a needless waste. 
Have the Railroads Pursued the Wrong Objectives? 
There is ample evidence that railway management is 
becoming increasingly ccnscious of the advantages of new and 
better equipment.34 But will these forward-looking but yet 
traditional solutions be enough to make the railroads viable 
again? Mr. J. Edward Ray, transportation economist for the 
u.s. Department of Agriculture and previously thirteen years 
with the Southern Pacific Railroad, had this to say: 
Railroad operations by traditional yardsticks are 
highly efficient, but render a service that apparently 
is unsatisfactory for being irregular and slow. If 
the railroads intend fully to comply with shippers' 
needs, it will be necessary deliberately to adopt 
comparatively inefficient operating methods, as such 
methods are measured by traditiopal yardsticks. Such 
a reverse course of action would requir~ radical changes 
in operating objectives and practices.3/ 
Service Now the Battleground 
The shipper is boss more than ever before. It will 
do little good to give him an increasingly efficient service 
that he does not want, because there are other carriers pre-
pared to provide the desired service at reasonable levels of 
efficiency. What is it that shippers appear to want in the 
34"Railroad Accomplishments of Recent Years," P• 46. 
35J. E. Ray, "Will Better Service Mean Some In-
efficiency," Railway Age, March 11, 1957, P• 72. 
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way of service? First of all, they want reasonable speed 
from door to door and here the railroads still face massive 
problems despite some increase in train speeds, switching 
operations, and freight handling. The freight train is still 
basically slow, averaging 19.9 MPH in 1961, but more important 
are the delays in getting started and handling en route.36 
Maybe the rails should operate freight trains as they do 
passenger trains with an eye for quick, prompt service rather 
than statistics on ton-miles and average car loads. 
That there are other service requirements besides 
train speed is pointed out by Joe w. Kizzia, transportation 
editor of Railway Age magazine. 
It is becoming recognized, of course, that speed is not 
the only factor in improving railroad service. Over-
all dependability - involving prompt dispatching of cars 
at origin, safe and efficient handling en route, arrival 
times geared to shipper needs and demands, and on-time 
placement at destination - is at least equally important. 
So is performance in making delivery to connections and 
in maintaining advertised schedules.37 
Efficient railroading is not necessarily efficient 
shipper service, especially when cost savings to the shipper 
become minor considerations in comparison to taut schedules 
and assured delivery. This becomes largely a management 
affair, requiring management decision and management in-
novation. For years railroad management has decried the loss 
36A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, P• 
37J. w. Kizzia, "Freight is Moving Faster," 
R~a~i~lw~a~y~A~ge~, January 23, 1956, P• 32. 
28. 
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of management flexibility as regards rates and choice of 
carrier, and they have been right. Yet, there is a field of 
competition which commissions are likely to encourage and to 
leave up to management - and that is service competition. 
Areas of Possible Change in Railroad Practice 
There are several areas of railroading where change 
may be desirable or is actually under way. 
1. There may be presently too much concentration 
on the train - how fast it goes, how frequently it breaks 
down, how large a haul it carries. Maybe more emphasis should 
be placed on the car - how clean, modern, and suitable to 
specifications it is, how fast it can be loaded and unloaded, 
how quickly it can reach the customer and how closely it 
follows a set schedule. One way of accomplishing this might 
be to run more frequent schedules of shorter trains rather 
than the present irregular schedule of starting a train trip 
only when fully loaded. This would require less emphasis on 
tonnage, which may prove less efficient in a technical sense 
but good business in many other ways.38 
2. The railroads are giving up the idea that they 
are the basic transportation medium in all categories of 
transport. To an increasing extent they are accepting the in-
herent advantages of other modes of transportation as well as 
38schafers and Kohlmeier, loc. cit., P• 1. 
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of their own and they are concentrating on their own in-
herent advantages of moving bulk shipments (e.g., grains, 
ores, lumber) over long hauls. 
This is evident in the greater emphasis on effective 
pricing to meet competition and in increased attention to 
such devices as piggy-backing. Whether this new approach 
results from desperation or enlightenment, it is a favorable 
development. 
3• The whole question of mergers is now under 
serious consideration. James Symes, President of Pennsylvania 
Railroad, sees mergers as the salvation of the desperately 
struggling railroads.39 There are too many railroads, undue 
duplication of facilities, and wasteful competition among 
them. A reduction in the number of American railroads would 
make for stronger railroads with easier access to the capital 
that is now so difficult to obtain. Such a step would make 
for more streamlined operations and more uniform approaches 
to such problems as purchasing and technological development. 
Any advances along these lines should enhance the railroads' 
ability to give better service. At the very least there 
could be far more joint action on such simple matters as 
deciding on certain types of railroad equipment. 
39Newsweek, August 27, 1962, PP• 70-74• 
New York Times, January 13, 1962, PP• 1, 8. 
Boston Globe, April 29, 1962, P• A5· 
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As an example, Walter w. Patchell, Vice President 
for special services of the Pennsylvania Railroad, told the 
ICC recently that a Pennsy-N,Y. Central merger would make 
available ~56 million within five years through the sale of 
excess property of both roads.40 
Mergers, however, are more of a long-run solution 
than an immediate answer to the present difficulties of the 
industry: earnings remain inadequate and financial reserves 
dangerously low; regulatory lag is still a serious drag on 
the exercise of sound business judgment; the public's sus-
picions of railway intentions have been only partly allayed, 
a complicating factor in efforts to alter present service or 
change the structure of the rail industry; and government 
continues to foster rail competitors while severely restricting 
and heavily taxing the railroads. 
Passenger Service - Another Failure in Performance 
Passenger service, particularly on the shorter hauls, 
is handled largely by old, unattractive equipment. Undoubt-
edly passenger service on many runs is beyond the power of 
good management and sound regulation to resurrect. 
Passenger service, like street railway service, is 
to an extent becoming economically obsolete. Changing social 
patterns and government subsidy of roads and airlines have 
40New York Times, November 12, 1962, P• 47• 
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made these changes inevitable and may be expected to lead to 
continued declines in passenger traffic. The railroads can 
hardly compete with the airlines on long haul trips as to speed 
or with the automobiles as to flexibility. Because passenger 
service has been contracting over the years and the total 
stock of passenger cars is declining, over one-half of all pas-
senger cars were found to be more than thirty years old in 
1958.41 The rate of replacement has been barely nominal 
(averaging 272 new cars annually since 1952).42 At such a 
rate railroad passenger equipment is bound to become increas-
ingly obsolescent - and increasingly unpopular as a method of 
travel. As Mr. Perlman of the New York Central has said, 
"The New York Commission has said that I must operate passenger 
business without profit. You gentlemen can imagine how many 
passenger cars I am going to purchase under such conditions. n43 
There are serious implications far public safety 
as well as for public service in the increasing deterioration 
of passenger facilities. The heavy loss of life in the 1958 
crash of a Jersey Central commuter train revealed that safety 
devices both inside and outside the train were obsolete.44 
41st. Louis Globe Democrat, t-1arch 30, 19.58, P• 3· 
42A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, P• 27. 
43wall Street Journal, September 22, 1958, P• 24. 
44New York Times, September 16, 1958, P• 1. 
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It is difficult for the ICC or state commissions to insist 
on costly equipment to maintain safety standards when earnings 
of passenger service since the Depression have so often failed 
to meet operating expenses. Reasonable safety, of course, is 
part of minimum service that the public bas a right to expect. 
The best guarantee of proper standards is modern equipment, 
but it is a difficult choice for railroad management to put 
its limited capital into what appears to be a dying part of 
railroading. 
The large deficits on passenger train operation have 
drained away funds which would otherwise have been available 
for maintenance improvement of freight facilities and service 
or, in the case of some roads, the payment of more nearly 
adequate dividends to stockholders.45 Finally, there simply 
has been no money available for experimentation in new con-
cepts of service, such as the Japanese railways have been 
conducting. The Japanese National Railways developed a 
bullet-shaped streamliner, controlled by computers, and having 
a programmed speed of 124 MPH. What is more important, they 
are competing against other forms of transportation with 
special catering to the passengers - studying their desires 
and attempting to meet their needs.46 
45"The Dying Passenger Train," loc. cit. 
46Time, November 9, 1962, PP• 96-97· 
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The Role of Railroads in Nation and Comma~ity 
The importance of the railroads in the nation's 
economy has declined. The automobile, airplane, and truck 
have in part displaced the rails in certain specialized cate-
gories of travel - such as long distance passenger service 
and short haul, small-load freight traffic. 
No'TE: ~,. <Arriu 
SOURCE: 
CHART 1 
INTERCiTY "FRe..\~·~--\T TRAFfic. 
IN "niE UNI't'£I) S1'A S 1'\3<\- 1.'11'-1. 
Also, other developme ts - in commun cations, 
chemistry, electric power, and technlcal education - have 
come to share in that pre-eminence in the economic life of 
the nation formerly held by the railroads almost exclusively. 
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Railroads and the Nation's Growth 
Despite the loss of much of the more lucrative 
traffic to other carriers, the railroads benefited from the 
nation's growing economy until 1957 when traffic volume began 
to fall off. Railroad freight volume increased from 447 
billion ton-miles in 1929 to 647 billion ton-miles in 1956, 
1 
or about 45 per cent. In 1961, the rails carried 563 billion 
ton-miles, which is still impressive and shows that railroads 
are fulfilling, even now, a major portion of the nation's 
transportation needs.2 On the other hand, the steady decline 
in the proportion of freight and passengers carried by the 
railroads indicates that they are becoming relatively less 
important to ·the nation and the community, however basically 
necessary they will continue to be. 
Railroads and the Nation's Defense 
Railroads are vital to the defense of the modern 
state.3 American railroads showed this in World War II when 
they proved their resiliency in meeting emergency needs. The 
lH. A. DeButts, "Railroads and Highway Carriers," 
a speech delivered before the Transportation Investment 
Forum, as sponsored and reported by Chase Manhatt~~ Bank in 
a booklet by that title, P• 18. 
P• 30. 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, op. cit., 
2Moody 1 s Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., P• a 6. 
3westmeyer, op. cit., p. 13. 
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railroads proved how flexible they could be in increasing 
load capacity for carrying the great proportion of military 
equipment that can move only by rail; the railroads carried 
petroleum and petroleum products until the Big- and Little-
inch pipelines could be built, when tankers were unable to 
operate in submarine-infested waters and gasoline had to be 
rationed for military uses; railroads were the only mass-
transportation medium capable of carrying the millions of 
troops that had to be transported in the u.s. and these move-
ments the railroads handled efficiently.4 
At the beginning of World War II the railroads had 
considerable amounts of equipment that had been idle during 
the Depression. This equipment was readily adapted for 
emergency purposes. Military authorities are now showing 
concern that another war would find the nation without adequate 
rail transport facilities. The former director of the Nili-
tary Traffic Management Agency has stated that he does not 
know " • • • how we are going to move troops if we should 
have an emergency tomorrow • • • the situation on the rail-
roads, the carrier on which we will have to depend, is 
serious •••• n5 His concern is understandable when one 
notes that passenger-carrying cars, which numbered 15,004 in 
4Ibid., P• 14. 
5u.s., Interstate Commerce Commission, Report No. 
31954, Railroad Passenger Train Deficit, as proposed by 
Howard Hosmer, Hearing Examiner, sheet 68. 
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1961, have shown a reduction of 40 per cent since 1952· One 
indication of this concern is that the u.s. Army has stockpiled 
1,222 used Pullman cars for emergency use - which is a tacit 
recognition that railroad passenger service necessary to any 
future war effort should be provided by the ta~.x:p aying public 
rather than the railroads.6 
The Railroads as Taxpayers 
Of every dollar of railway operating income the 
railroads in 1961 paid approximately 11¢ in taxes compared 
with 6.3¢ in the late 1920 1s, 15.6¢ in the early 40's, which 
were the war years, and 8.7¢ in the late 1940's. 7 Currently 
taxes total about $1 billion annually, comprising roughly 30 
per cent in the form of F'ederal income taxes, with the rest 
in the form of payroll, state, and local taxes. 8 
The extreme variability of the railroads' taxable 
income means that the industry is an unstable source of tax 
revenu~ to the Federal government. Intrinsically, of course, 
income taxes are an unstable tax resource but the instability 
is emphasized in the case of railroads by the speed at which 
operating margins are reduced or completely eliminated by a 
decline in operating revenues. 
6Ibid., sheet 65. 
AAR, A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, ££• 
cit., P• 27. 
7Moody 1 s Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., P• a 8. 
8Ibid. 
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As property taxpayers, the railroads have been and 
still are a valuable asset to local taxing authorities. 9 For 
many smaller communities railroad property constitutes a large 
proportion of the tax base. There is reason to believe that 
as much local opposition to sale or abandonment of railway 
property is generated by the fear of lost tax revenues as by 
the fear of poorer transportation services to the cities or 
towns involved.lO 
National transportation policy, through direct or 
indirect subsidies to competing forms of transportation, has 
undermined the status of the railroads as property taxpayers, 
particularly in the case of railroad property primarily used 
for passenger transportation. Not only has such property be-
come a questionable tax source but the communities involved 
may have to resort to subsidies merely to keep them in 
operation.l1 
The situation in and around New York City is per-
haps an extreme example but it is a classic illustration of 
the problem. The Iong Island Railroad has been granted a 
9i;r. Schafers and L. Kohlmeier, ":t.iailroads Ask 
State to Cut Property Tax," St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 
20, 19.58, part of series entitled, "What's Wrecking the 
Hailroads?" 
10
westmeyer, op. cit., P• 334• 
ll"The Dying Passenger Train," loc. cit. 
• 
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50 per cent relief from property taxes.12 The Staten Island 
Railroad is being subsidized by the city to offset a ~1,000,000 
per year operating deficit.l3 The New York Central Railroad, 
in addition to property taxes, pays a franchise tax to New 
York City of some $J,OOO,OOO a year. This tax is levied on 
the railroad's right to use certain city streets for entry 
into the Grand Central Terminal. 14 The city not only may lose 
part or all of these taxes but may find itself obliged to 
take title to passenger facilities within the city or to sub-
sidize passenger service. In either event, the cost to the 
city would run into millions of dollars. It is becoming 
increasingly obvious that passenger service, instead of sup-
porting the government through taxes, must be supported by 
the gover~~ent through subsidies or else cease to exist. 
Freight service is still a heavy and reliable 
contributor to local tax funds. As in the case of many other 
large industrial property owners, the railroads have been 
subject to discriminatory property valuations and, in the 
years ahead, the financial plight of the railroads may force 
downward readjustments in valuations. For example, railroad 
property in New Jersey is assessed at 100 per cent of its 
value while other property is assessed on a lower basis.l5 
12Moody's Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., 1958 
edition, P• 692. 
13New York Times, October 7, 1958, P• 38. 
14Ibid., June 16, 1958. 
l5Ibid., J·uly 24, 1958, P• 33• 
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In California the railroads and utilities, which are paying 
approximately 12 per cent of the $1.6 billion in local property 
taxes levied in that state, complain that their property is 
assessed at twice the statewide average for other property. 16 
As an ICC examiner said in his report, "It suggests a kind of 
cold warfare being waged against the railroads." 
The Railroad Industry as an Employer 
Currently the railroads employ over 700,000 people 
and pay them at an annual rate of ~?4.6 billion. 17 The importance 
of this employment to the nation and in particular to many 
individual cities and towns is obvious. The amount of railroad 
employment is currently about two-thirds as great as it was 
ten years ago but is still greater than employment in other 
major industries. 1 8 
The downward trend in railway employment has been 
unfortunate for many communities which have depended upon 
railroad labor but it is the inevitable price of progress and 
change. The drop cannot be attributed primarily to the fi-
nancial plight of the railroads but results in large measure 
from improved tec~nology and other gains in efficiency and to 
someextent from declines in passenger traffic. Obviously, if 
the railroads had had more funds for maintenance and capital 
16wall Street Journal, October 8, 1958, P• 5. 
17AAR, A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, P• 15. 
18Ibid. 
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improvement, more people might have been employed during the 
postwar period. Conversely, however, additional sums spent 
for capital improvement might well have speeded up the intro-
duction of labor-saving devices. A decline in employment is 
inevitable whenever the number of men released as a result 
of improved teclmology and increased efficiency exceed the 
number of additional men required by actual growth. 
TABLE 6 
EI1PLOYlvJ.ENT IN SELEC'fED INDUSTRIEsl9 
Industry 
Primary metal industries 
Class I railroads 
Telephone and telegraph 
Motor vehicles and equip-
ment manufacturing 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • 
1961 Employment 
(thousands) 
1,142 
717 
732 
650 
A long-term decline in employment can be endured, 
even though painful, as the price of progress. The same can-
not be said for short-term, cyclical changes which have 
plagued the railroads in their capacity as employers. Sharp 
drops in employment bring the debilitating effects of business 
recession to other people in the community. Thus, the 
Pennsylvania Railroad shut down its car repair shops in 
Altoona, Pennsylvania during the recession year 1958, throwing 
19u.s., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 
of the United States: 1962, PP• 221-222. 
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1 , 600 people out of work . 20 Under such conditions the industry 
loses its reputation as a good employer - in short , everybody 
loses . The loss to the community in many instances can be 
attributed to the inadequate financial mar ins of the railroad 
industry . When business recedes and available funds decline , 
the roads have no alternative to cuts in maintenance and re -
ductions in capital programs . The industry is forced into 
uneconomical reductions in employment with the result that the 
condition of roadbed and equipment deteriorates . The inevitable 
consequence is that the railroads are then in a poor position 
to contribute to business recovery and actually may become 
a drag on the economy. 
CHART 2 
E. PLO I'IEtVI AND c M:PE SAiiON' 
It.(Df 
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20:Moody 1 s Investors Ser•vice , Inc ., 11oody 1 s Trans-
portation (semi - weekly bulletin) , July 4, 1958, P • l339· 
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The effects of business recession on railroad em-
ployment are quite evident in the following table, which 
shows losses occurring in certain key recession years: 
Year 
TABLE 7 
COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF RECESSIONS ON TOTAL 
EIVIPLOYHENT AND RAILWAY EJ."'PLOYNENT21 
Per Cent Losses from Previous Years 
F.R.B. Index Class I Total Non-farm Industrial Railway Employment Production Employment 
1949 -6·7 -1.6 -10.2 
1954 -6·7 -1.8 -11.7 
1958 -7.0 -1.2 -14.9 
It should be perfectly obvious that a policy of 
concent1•ating railroad work into good times is economically 
unfortunate. When compounded with the a'dverse effects of a 
21u.s., Department of Commerce, Business Statistics 
1957 Biennial Edition, PP• 7, 56. 
772· 
op. cit., 
u.s., Bureau of the Census, op. cit., PP• 215, 
AAR, A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, 
P· ts. 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, Yearbook 
of Railway Qperat~, op. cit., P• 82. 
u.s., Joint Economic Committee of Congress and 
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Indicators, September 
1958, PP• 11, 16. 
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natural long-term downturn in railroad employment, the situ-
ation becomes even more acute. Morale suffers. People are 
afraid of their jobs. Feather-bedding and other efforts to 
spread the work are a natural result. The men see innovation 
and efforts to modernize railroading as cutting out work op-
portunities. As one union leader told the st. Louis Globe-
Democrat recently, "Every change in the name of progress means 
fewer jobs for our people.n22 
Another attitude that develops is that railroads are 
dying - that opportunity does not exist for younger men. 23 
Such an attitude, of course, compounds the railroads' diffi-
culties in meeting and overcoming their current problems. 
With this record, railroads are a doubtful asset to those 
cities in which they are important employers of labor. 
Railroads and Their Investors 
Since the decade of the 1930's there has been some 
improvement in the over-all railroad financial picture. Since 
then the only important insolvency among Class I railroads 
22T. Schafers and L. Kohlmeier, "@4,200,000 Paid 
to Extra Crews under States' Make-work Laws," St. Louis 
Globe-Democrat, Narch 19, 1958, part of series ent~tled, 
"What's Wrecking the Railroads?"· 
23Ibid. 
T. Schafers and L. Kohlmeier, "Thirty Major 
Systems on Brink of Bankruptcy this Year," st. Louis Globe-
Democrat, March 23, 1958, part of series entitled, "What 1 s 
Wrecking the Railroads? 11 • 
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has been the recent case of the New Haven Railroad.24 Both 
net income and dividends have shown an upward trend until 
quite recently, and the Dow Jones average of market prices of 
railroad stocks is more than four times as high as in 1940. 
This apparently favorable picture is illustrated by the fol-
lowing table: 
TABLE 8 
RAILROAD NET INCOIVIE AND TOTAL DIVIDENDs25 
Year Net Income Total Dividends (millions of dollars) 
1940 243 217 
1945 502 295 
1950 855 349 
1951 758 374 
1952 900 394 
1953 940 445 
1954 712 405 
1955 959 476 
1956 908 476 
1957 765 466 
1958 630 445 
1959 608 432 
1960 473 412 
However, this superficially favorable trend is 
deceptive. Net income in 1960 was only 3 per cent of book 
equity and dividends were only 2-l/2 per cent.26 Even 
24Moody 1 s Investors Service, Inc., ££• cit., PP• 
a 10, a 41, a 51, a 52, a 58. 
25Ibid., PP• a 5, a 6, a 7• 
26capitalization for 1960 obtained from Moody's 
Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., P• a 46. 
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unsatisfactory postwar records would have been impossible had 
it not been for the unprecedented level of general business 
activity during the war and most of the postwar period. The 
very sharp effects of the 1958 business recession show up in 
sh~ly reduced earnings for 1958 and the years following. 
Railroads are thus shown to be a precarious source of invest-
ment income. .t11ioreover, the total for the industry is deceptive 
because it hides tremendous variations in operating margins 
among individual railroads. These variations are evident 
from a review of the percentages of gross revenues carried 
through to net operating income before Federal income taxes. 
The following table shows these percentages for a few selected 
railroads in 1957 and 1958: 
TABLE 9 
PER ,CENT OF RAILWAY GROSS REVENITES CARRIED 
THROUGH TO NET OPERATING INCOME 
BEFORE TAXES - SELECTED RAILROADs27 
Railroad 1957 
Norfolk and ~'/estern. • • • • • • • • • 29.9 
Kansas City Southern • • . • • • • • • 29·3 
Chesapeake and Ohio. • • • • • • • . . 25·4 
Southern • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 20.2 
New York, Chicago and St. Louis • • • 18.4 
Chicago and Great Western. • • . • • • 18.3 
Seaboard Air Line. • • • • • • • • • • 17.2 
Pennsylvania • • • • • • • • • • • • • 4·3 
New York Central • • • • • • • • • • • 4·1 
Nissouri, Kansas and Texas • • • • • . 3·4 
New York, New Haven and Hartford • • • 0·4 
27~., PP• a 42 -a 43• 
1958 
33·4 
27.2 
22.3 
18.5 
16.0 
16.9 
13·1 
1.5 
2.0 
7·2 
2.6 
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This wide variation among railroads means, of course, 
that some individual carriers have been a fairly reliable 
source of income to stockholders, whereas others have been a 
highly erratic and questionable source or have paid no divi-
dends whatsoever. Take, for example, the records, as a 
percentage of book value, of the Chesapeake and Ohio and the 
New York Central Common stocks: 
TABLE 10 
NET INCOI•fE AND DIVIDENDS A3 PER CENT Oi<' BOOK VALUE -
NKw YORK CENTRAL AND CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILROADs28 
Chesapeake and Ohio New York Central 
Year 
Net Income Dividends Net Income Dividends 
1951 6.7% 3·2~~ 2 5d 0.4% • /0 
1952 8.1 4·3 3·7 o.~ 
1953 8.6 4·3 5.0 o. 
1954 7·1 4·3 1.5 -
1955 10·3 4·5 6.0 1·4 
1956 11.8 5·2 4·5 1.9 
1957 11.9 5·7 1·3 1.9 
1958 9.0 5·7 (0.5) -
1959 7·2 5.1 1.0 0.1 
1960 6.5 5·0 0.3 0.3 
1961 4-6 5.1 0·7 -
Although there are individual exceptions, the rail-
roads are a speculative investment. Speculation is attractive 
when there is some likelihood of hi64 returns, but in the 
case of the railroads high risk has been combined with low 
28As computed from Ibid., PP• 720-721; 900-904• 
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and unpredictable returns. Under these conditions the rail-
roads have found their equity sources of capital dried up and 
their sources of debt capital increasingly reluctant to pro-
vide funds in the amounts needed. 29 The outlook is for 
further retrenchments of railroads so that the industry is 
likely to prove even less attractive to the private investor 
in the future. In short, the railroads are a doubtful 
financial asset to the nation and could become a financial 
liability if further steps are not taken to permit them more 
freedom and flexibility in operation. 
Railroads in the Business and Civic Life 
of the Community 
One recent emphasis of business has been on 
charitable contributions to worthwhile philanthropic organi-
zations in the community. Sears Roebuck and Pepsi Cola have 
their scholarship programs and many companies set aside 
certain sums every year for donation to various charities. 
The National Industrial Conference Board, in 1958, completed 
a study of business policy towards company contributions.3° 
There were 180 firms of numerous categories studied and it 
was found that an average of •74 per cent of their net income 
before taxes was set aside for contributions. Only one rail-
road was represented in the study - an Eastern road - and 
2'Jr,Hller et al., op. cit., P• 25. 
30National Industrial Conference Board, Com~anl 
Contributions, III - Policies and Procedures (New Yor~: by 
the Conference Board, 1958). 
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this road gave .5 per cent of its net income before taxes to 
contributions. Railroads did not rate a special category in 
the study, suggesting that they are not a major source of 
contributory funds. 
However, there has been some recent recognition by 
the railroads of the public relations benefits to be obtained 
for the railroads through community action. In 1953 the 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference established a Com-
munity Relations Committee to decide on what community pro-
jects to sponsor and to coordinate activities among the 
Eastern railroads. Since then the Committee has actively 
supported the March of Dimes, Red Cross, and Community Chest. 
It has also participated in other activities of purely local 
interest.31 
The Railroads as Customers 
Like other industries, the railroads are affected 
adversely by recessions and beneficially in times of good 
business. However, unlike many other industries, the rail-
roads do not have the financial flexibility to provide for 
such contingencies as recessions. When recessions come, the 
rails must provide basic passenger and freight service but, 
otherwise, they have extensive margins for cutting back on 
the purchases of fuel and materials, the installations of new 
equipment, and the letting of contracts for building or main-
Jln Grass Roots Public Relations," Railway Age, 
October 18, 1954• 
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tenance. 
TABLE 11 
PER CENT DECLINE IN PURCF..ASES BY RAILROADS IN KEY 
RECESSION YEARS FROM PRIOR YEARS -
SELECTED PRODO CTs32 
Forest Iron and l'1iscel- Total Fuel Year Fuel Steel laneous and Products Products Products Hate rials 
1949 -32·3 -14.6 -23.1 -19.0 -24-8 
195~ -15·0 -35·1 -33·6 -24·4 -2_5.8 
195 -18.3 -41·9 -47·3 -25·9 -32·3 
1961 + 0.1 -27·8 -2_5.8 -11.3 -13·7 
Because the railroads have such inadequate operating 
margins, many of their decisions as to purchases or main-
tenance are, in practice, based on the "flow of cash" at any 
particular time. Naintenance, for example, is kept oonsta.nt 
in terms of per cent of operating income, but when operating 
income falls (in a recession, for example), the amounts 
available for such maintenance naturally fall off.33 That 
this recessionary effect also holds true of fuel and materials 
purchases is evident from Table 11, indicating the decline 
in such purchases in the key recession years of 1949, 1954, 
1958, and 1961. 
In each of the recession years fuel and materials 
32Noody 1 s Investors Service, Inc., op. cit., PP• 
a _5, a 32. 
33computed from Ibid., PP• a _5, a 33· 
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purchases dropped sharply either because there was no money 
available or from fear of committing what financial reserves 
were available for items that were not absolutely essential. 
What is true of fuel and materials is even more 
true of purchases of rolling stock. Purchases of freight cars, 
for example, declined from 95,000 in 1948 to 40,000 in 1950; 
from 67,000 in 1953 to 28,000 in 1954; from 88,000 in 1957 
to 39,000 in 1958; and from 47,000 in 1960 to 26,000 in 1961. 
Locomotive installations fell from 2,100 in 1953 to 1,113 in 
1954; from 1,316 to 434 in 1958; and from 453 to 274 in 
1961.34 This is clear indication that railroads are blown 
with the business winds. They cut back on their purchases 
as demand for their services declines. C:hart 3 indicates 
the pattern of spending on capital and other purchases 
during the period 1952-61. 
Where orders for equipment are placed when the 
demand actually appears instead of in anticipation of need, 
delivery of equipment often occurs when the demand has passed. 
All of this is undesirable from several points of view. In 
the first place, the railroads are unable to make the intel-
ligent planning decisionsthat good management requires.35 
34zastern Railroad Presidents Conference, op. cit. 
P• 20. 
AAR, A Review of Railroad Operations in 1961, ~· 
cit., PP• 26-27• 
35nThe Railroads: Economics May be Starting to 
~Jork for Them," Business \'leek, July 13, 1957, P• 106. 
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In the second place, railroads become less of the stabilizing 
force in the economy that they should be. Contractors, 
suppliers, and manufacturers of railway equipment are thus 
subjected to highly volatile market conditions when a better 
railroad financial situat:on would eatly alleviate these 
conditions . 
CHART 3 
CA ITA\.. E ;( PE. I TU R £ AND 7uRc '"'ASE.S 
A\LROADS 
:Do1..LA RS 
SiSYuRC.KA~ES cf Tut.l. MA11: AL NU> Su~u:.s 
'+,000 
3.500 
----- ~~ CAPiTAl.. &P.OWO nu"t.S To A:w1TION~ AM~l1h:tu. ~WlS 
tSl. 131 
Pullman, Inc., maker of ra'lway equipment, presents 
a good exa ple of how a railroad supplier can suffer sharp 
cutbacks in orders when its railway customers are retrenching. 
Its orders for frei .t cars fell 46 per cent from 1957 to 
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1958 and in 1961 orders fell another 30 per cent to less than 
one-half the level of five years previous.o6 '.rhe effect on 
Pullman's earnings, employment, and wage payments is not 
difficult to guess. Perhaps the conclusion to be drawn from 
all of this is that misfortunes experienced by the railroads 
tend to have repercussions on other industries and the 
ecoLomy generally. 
36computed from figures obtained in Moody's 
Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Industrial :Manual, ed. John 
Sherman Porter (New York: l962), p. 2052; also l959 edition 
p. 2237. ' 
PART IV 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON GOOD AND POOR 
EARIUN G RAILROADS 
- 72 -
- 73 -
Variation in Earnings 
The preceding sections of this report have, in 
general discussed the railroad industry as a whole. However, 
generalizations based on the aggregate performance of the 
113 Class I railroads in the United States conceal the fact 
that there is wide variation in their earnings records. 
To illustrate, Fortune J.VIagazine (August 1962) 
listed the thirty largest railroads and their earnings in 
1961. 1 Their average net income as a per cent of net worth 
in that year was 2.8 per cent. The range about that average 
extended from the 8.0 per cent return of the Norfolk and 
1t/estern to a deficit of 1 • .5 per cent for the New liaven. 
Four other roads operated at a deficit and sixteen others 
earned less than 4 per cent. In general, Eastern roads made 
up the low end of the list. 
Significance of Railroad Earnings as Reported 
Caution is necessary in comparing the return on 
investment of various railroads because of the numerous 
instances of bankruptcy and reorganization in their history. 
A Seaboard Air Line may appear to be a far more profitable 
road than the virtually parallel Atlantic Coast Line, but the 
comparison is distorted because twice in past years a part 
of the Seaboard's investment was wiped out in reorgani-
lFortune, August 1962, p. 121. 
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zations.2 Return on the value of physical assets is a 
sounder measure of the relative economic profits from rail 
operations. 
In comparing railroad earnings one must also note 
that many railroads are fortunate in having large amounts of 
non-operating, income from oil, gas, timber, real estate, and 
other non-rail operations. Over-all corporate results may be 
due more to good fortune in early land grants than to superior 
railroad management. 
Economic Factors Affecting Profits 
The profitableness of railroad operations is 
largely determined by the basic econo::nics of geosraphy. Some 
of these economic factors are:3 
Average Length of Haul 
~vi th a long haul, burdensome terminal costs are 
less of a factor and traffic is less susceptible to truck 
co!npetition.4 Roads like the Union Pacific and the Santa Fe 
with average hauls of over 500 miles have a big advantage 
2Business Week, October 11, 1958, PP• 84 ff. 
Hoody's Investors Service, Inc., l'loody 1 s Trans-
portation Manual, 1962 edition, PP• 306, 695· 
3Ibid., references to individual railroads as well 
as general discussion. 
Westmeyer, op. cit. 
4Business \veek, Nay 10, 1958, p. 32· 
E. T. Thompson, loc. cit., P• 137• 
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over roads like the Reading and the Central of New Jersey 
which average less than 100 miles. 
Revenue Freight Density 
Since roadway must be maintained whether or not it 
supports a heavy traffic load, maintenance of way ratios for 
light density roads tend to be higher than for roads with 
heavy density. Thus, bulk commodity carriers like the 
Pittsburgh and Lake Erie, Norfolk and Western, Chesapeake 
and Ohio, and Virginian (with from six to nine million ton-
miles per year per mile of track) have a great advantage over 
roads like the Maine Central and the Bangor and Aroostook 
(with one million or less ton-miles per mile of track). 
Percentage of Tonnage Originated 
Roads which originate a large percentage of the 
tonnage they handle are in a stronger competitive position 
than carriers dependent upon connections for most of their 
tonnage. The Virginian, Louisville and Nashville, and 
Norfolk and Western originate over 75 per cent while the New 
Haven and the Boston and Haine originate about 25 per cent. 
Proportions of Passenger and Commuter Service 
Freight haulers like the Pocahontas coal carriers, 
with little or no passenger service, have a great advantage 
over roads required to serve metropolitan area commuters, at 
heavy loss. 
Degree of Competition with Other Carriers 
Where a network of modern high speed highways 
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exists, railroads encounter more severe truck competition 
than in re3ions where such highway development is retarded. 
iihere cheaper water transport is available (e.g. Great Lakes 
for Mesabi iron ore and St. Lawrence Seaway for Labrador 
ore), rail carriers are also at a disadvantage. The Seaway 
adds th the competitive problems of the Pennsylvania and New 
York Central roads. 
Degree of Discrimination in State and Local Taxation 
Some railroads are more fortunate than others in 
this respect. Roads with considerabl~ property in New Jersey 
and in California appear to be least fortunate.5 
State Regulatory Climate 
Again, some roads are more fortunate than others 
in obtaining relatively prompt action on abandonments, intra-
state rate changes, and other regulatory decisions required 
for efficient operations. New York and New Jersey are re-
garded by the railroads as among the less sympathetic juris-
dictions. 
Quality of Management 
Although these numerous variations in external 
economic conditions undoubtedly provide the controlling factors 
in the relative profitability of railroad operations, dif-
fera~ces in the quality of railroad management must also play 
5rbid., P• 138. 
Wall Street Journal, October 8, 1958, P• 5· 
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no small part in the relative success of various railroads. 
It has not, however, been possible within the scope of this 
study to attempt to appraise railroad managements. 
Good vs. Poor Earning Railroads 
Just as there are many difficulties in classifying 
railroads as good earning or poor earning in the light of dif-
ferences in basic operating conditions, it is equally diffi-
cult to determine differences in quality of service. N"o 
simple basic measure of quality of railroad service exists. 
There are certain statistics which may provide indirect 
measures of the service job, such as maintenance expenditures, 
new oar purchases, cross ties and rails replaced, age of 
rolling stock, etc. Both the poorer earning roads and the 
better ones show highly erratic performances by most of these 
measures, and no clear conclusions can be drawn. 
Analysis of the sources and uses of funds of ten 
better earning railroads (earnings of at least 4 per cent on 
net worth) and ten poorer earning roads in one recent reces-
sion, that of 1953-1954, shows no superiority on the part of 
the better earning roads in promoting economic stability.6 
6As shown by figures obtained in Hoody's Trans-
portation Manuals (1958 and 1962 editions). 
"Good earners 11 chosen were: Southern; Seaboard; 
Chesapeake & Ohio; Delaware & Hudson; Reading; N.Y., Chicago 
& St. Louis; Santa Fe; Denver & Rio Grande Western; Kansas 
City Southern; and Great Northern. 
"Poor earners 11 chosen were: Atlantic Coast Line; 
Central of Georgia; B & 0; B & M; Erie; Lehigh Valley; 
Chicago & lVIilwaukee; Chicago & North Western; l·iissouri-
Kansas-Texas; and Chicago & Rock Island. 
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The choice of this recession allows us historic perspective 
and a chance to see how these same roads have done since. 
The decline in resources from normal internal 
sources - retained earnings and depreciation accruals - was 
greater for the poorer railroads in 1954· However, these 
poorer roads resorted to much greater liquidation of in-
vestments and dipped more deeply into current assets than did 
the better earners. 
Poorer earning roads cut their construction program 
substantially less in 1954 than did the good earners. Both 
groups maintained dividend payments and both made substantial 
reductions in their outstanding debt. 
In the net, the poorer roads apparently contributed 
more to economic stability (construction expenditures and 
dividend payments) than the better earners. For this one 
recession, at least, this bit of evidence does not indicate 
any net advantage to the community at large from better 
earning railroads. 
It may, however, be argued that the greater ap-
parent stability of the poor earning roads is illusory in a 
sense because prior to the recession their construction ex-
penditures and dividend payments may have been closer to an 
irreducible minimum than in the case of the better earners; 
hence when profits fell off they were forced to use whatever 
funds they could lay their hands on to maintain already low 
levels of expenditure. The better earning railroads, with 
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expenditures well above minimum requirements, conceivably 
could afford to make some cuts without serious jeopardy to 
their service or financial credit status. 
The average age of freight cars was found to be 
about the same (about seventeen years) for the two groups of 
railroads. Both. good and poor earning roads tended to cut 
maintenance expenditures and employment sharply in recessions. 
The two groups showed almost no differences in employment 
trends in the recession years 1949 and 1954· Both groups cut 
employment by about 10 per cent in both years. About the 
only safe observation regarding the superiority of the good 
earning road over the poor earner from the broad social-
economic view is that the better earning road pays generally 
better dividends. It is interesting that by 1961, several 
of the 1954 ngood earners" had slipped below a 4 per cent 
return, and one fell into the red. The 1954 "poor earners" 
were all still in that category in 1961, with several showing 
a deficit. 
One reaction to the contrasting poverty and prosper-
ity of individual railroads is illustrated in an editorial in 
the New Republic magazine in April of 1962. The editor noted 
that the New Haven Railroad was bankrupt and owed $50 million 
to the Federal government. In contrast, the good-earning 
Kansas City Southern had a large surplus which it intended 
to invest outside the railroad industry. The editorial 
proposed that this surplus be forcibly retained in the rail-
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road industry for as long as there is a weak railroad in the 
nation. 7 
There appears to be failure here to realize that 
the socially undesirable situation is not the surplus of the 
one railroad but the financial weakness of the other, which 
forces the diversion of public funds to the poor-earning 
railroad. Yet, the history of the railroad industry sug-
gests that earnings of railroads have been kept low under 
the theory that the public would benefit thereby. 
?New Republic, April 2, 1962, P• 8. 
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Financial Plight of the Rails Now 
Considered Normal 
Restrictive laws and unreasonable regulation were 
undermining the strength of the railroads for many years 
before it becarre evident either to railroad management, 
regulators, investors, or the public at large. Perhaps the 
most insidious effect of this situation is its effect on the 
minds and attitudes of men. Consider the railroad industry 
as a whole. The financial status has been so poor for so 
long that most people in government and even many in the 
railroad industry itself have come to think of the situation 
as normal and inevitable. Most of the recent change in the 
attitudes of some government people and railroad managers 
can be traced to the desperate situation of some of the 
railroads during recent business recessions. These attitudes 
toward the railroad industry which have developed over the 
years are not conducive to any real solution of the railroad 
problem. 
The long time it has taken for the unhappy situation 
of the railroads to make itself evident emphasizes the fact 
that the success or failure of either management or regulatory 
policies is not tested by operations this year or next. The 
real test comes not when times are relatively good but when 
adversity strikes. 
Cost of Capital Theory Inadequate 
Obviously earnings must be sufficiently high to 
- 83 -
attract needed capital, to allow a conservative debt ratio, 
and to permit sufficient financial latitude for needed 
improvements in meeting competition. The mere fact that an 
industry has attracted a great deal of capital does not prove 
it is a successful industry. The history of the railroad 
industry supports this view. Because investors did not 
realize the seriousness of the underlying weaknesses of the 
railroad situation they furnished substantial amounts of 
new capital to the industry in the decade of the 1920•s. 1 
This points up one of the fallacies of the cost of capital 
approach to regulation. Aside from penalizing good manage-
ment and rewarding poor management, it substitutes current 
investor appraisals for the appraisals of those who should 
be in a much better position to know the real strengtmand 
weaknesses of the industry. 
Flexible Incentives Required 
Based on the experience of the railroads, regulated 
industries face the risk that attitudes and opinions con-
earning them will become inflexible and outmoded. Professor 
Kenneth R. Boulding of the University of Michigan has re-
marked that "you can't regulate price without freezing the 
form of the product. n2 Certainly, there has been a strong 
tendency for restrictive regulation and inflexible attitudes 
lulmer, op. cit., PP• 44-45· 
2From a speech given by Kenneth E. Boulding, Profes-
sor of Economics, University of Michigan, May 12, 1958. 
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to discourage initiative and imagination in regulated industry. 
Allied to this is the risk that the fields of operations of 
regulated industries will be so restricted by laws and regu-
lation that they cannot effectively change with the times. 
Consider the case of the railroads: because of regulation, 
the industry's own attitudes, and a lack of capital, rail-
roads could neither fight competition effectively nor join 
it. They failed to evolve so as to meet effectively the 
varying transportation needs of the country as they became 
manifest. One might well ask the question, what incentive 
for ability there was with a ceiling of some 4 per cent on 
earnings levels. Regulated industry runs a serious long-
term risk if it is not permitted sufficient flexibility to 
meet any new competitors either with the service it is cur-
rently offering or by entering new lines of business. 
Lost Public Favor Hard to Recover 
Inflexible opinions are a serious problem to all 
regulated industries. One of the biggest hurdles railroad 
management must overcome is the attitude of the general public 
and politicians. The railroads once wielded tremendous power 
over the economic well-being of the cowaunity they serve, 
Frequently that power was abused and this, in turn, en-
couraged some of the government inequities and restraints 
that have plagued the railroads. The significant fact is 
that public attitudes formed over sixty years ago are still 
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widely prevalent today. 
Railroad history is a clear exan~le of how a poor 
financial status, restrictive laws and regulation, and outmoded 
ideas place an insurmountable barrier on the ability to give 
good service at the lowest possible cost. In the railroads 
this situation has developed over the period since regulation 
has been in effect. To an extent, the economy has adjusted 
itself to this situation through the use of competing car-
riers or the use of the shippers' own vehicles. In those 
cases where the railroads have a natural economic advantage 
this is unfortunate from the point of view of the well-being 
of society as a whole. Since it has been developing over 
such a comparatively long period it is extremely difficult 
at this late date to effect a rapid cure. This merely 
emphasizes that regulated industry must consider its major 
policies in the light of possible developments in the next 
generation and not just the next few years. 
Centralized Regulation is Slow and Inflexible 
In railroad regulation there h~s been a strong 
tendency toward centralization. This is unfortunate because, 
when an industry is regulated in toto rather than by indi-
vidual units, its size and apparent power are constantly 
impressed on the public mind. Because of the unduly restric-
tive attitudes of certain state commissions, the railroads 
have been virtually forced into favoring even greater central-
ization of regulation. The acuteness of their short-run 
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problems, particularly the abandonment of unprofitable 
service, prompted this move. Nevertheless, there is some 
reason to believe that centralized regulation may be bad for 
the railroads in the long-term. 
The Interstate Commerce Commission has been over-
worked and is hidebound with tradition. History shows that 
its decisions at times have been slow and unfavorable.3 
Furthermore, when certain decisions on vital local questions 
are made in ~'{ashington a new fear arises in the public mind, 
a fear of decision by fiat in concert with monopoly. 
Certainly, centralized regulation could mean more regulation 
applied inflexibly across the country. This very in-
flexibility has been and is one of the current burdens of 
the railroads. 
Good Regulation Requires Good Information 
Another lesson for regulated industry may be 
gleaned from railroad experience. Railroads have been his-
torically remiss in the adequacy of their cost accounting 
and cost analyses.4 It is often difficult or impossible for 
either management or commissions to know if proposed rail-
road rates would be compensatory or discriJninatory. Com-
missions and management are often forced to rely on historical 
and outdated tariff relationships. Certainly, effective 
3nearing and Owen, op. cit., PP• 231, 259. 
4Thompson, loc. cit., p. 139· 
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merchandizing depends on a knowledge of what things are 
profitable and what things are not. There is, of course, the 
danger that cost analyses will be used by regulators or indi-
vidual shippers to the detriment of the over-all profitability 
of the industry. 
Conclusions 
Some of the railroads, particularly some of the 
poor earning railroads, are fighting with desperation and 
with no little success to improve their lot. They are 
hampered by lack of capital which, in turn, comes from a 
long history of inadequate earnings. The railroad history 
demonstrates the truth of the dictum that without good 
earnings top grade service, at the lowest prices, is impos-
sible. Good and aggressive management and good earnings are 
both essential to the best results for the public. To a 
distressing extent the railroads have had neither. 
Is There Any Hope? 
In many ways, this is a discouraging presentation -
particularly in regard to the railroads but also, by impli-
cation, for other eegulated industries. On the other hand, 
the year 1962 has brought several brighter rays of possible 
changes of attitude on the part of government, regulating 
bodies, and even the public, that the railroad financial 
picture is so precarious that radical changes in approach are 
necessary. This recognition is bound to be transferred to 
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the whole area of regulated industry. 
Recent DeveloEments 
What are these favorable developments? They in-
volve depreciation, excise taxes, featherbedding, mergers, 
and commuter service: 
Depreciation 
The u.s. Treasury has prescribed new and more 
liberal depreciation schedules for railroads. Writeoff 
periods are reduced from twenty to thirty years to fourteen 
years or less. Potential benefits include modernized freight 
cars, stations, yards, communications, power, and track main-
tenance.5 
Excise Tax 
Congress, in 1962, repealed the 10 per cent tax 
on passenger fares, effective November 15, 1962. 6 
Featherbedding 
There have been two developments favoring the rails, 
the one a decision by an arbitrator of a dispute between the 
Chicago and North Western Railway and the Order of Railway 
Telegraphers which, in effect, upheld the railroad's right to 
abolish jobs no longer considered necessary;7 the second is 
5Boston Globe, September 28, 1962. 
'Ibid., January 3, 1963, P• 37• 
6rbid., September 28, 1962. 
7New York Times, October 10, 1962, PP• 1, 40. 
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even more decisive and is a report of the Presidential Rail-
road Commission, recommending new railroad work rules with 
the elimination of 30,000 jobs (mostly firemen), althoubh 
with protection of certain job rights and compensation in 
other cases.8 
Mergers 
On December 31, 1962, the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission approved the application of the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Railway to control the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The ICC 
said that the situation of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
is urgent and made its decision despite protests of the 
Justice Department and the labor union representatives. Other 
pending applications for merger of the financially weak New 
York Central with the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Norfolk 
and western with the Wabash and the Nickel Plate are now 
greatly enhanced. The Justice Department fears the possible 
restructuring of the entire Eastern railroad industry, which 
the railroad is undoubtedly seeking.9 
Commuter Service 
A Federal and state grant of $10 million to Greater 
Boston transit lines is a frank attempt to determine finally 
whether lower fares and frequent service will attract the 
commuting worker and shopper back to the trains. Frequent 
service and substantially lower fares through subsidy to the 
8Ibid., March 1, 1962, PP• 1, 18. 
9Boston Globe, January 1, 1963, PP• 1, 8. 
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rail lines are the bases for the experiment. 10 The first 
day of the Boston and Haine Railroad's experience with the 
new plan (January 7, 1963) proved better than all expectations, 
rising 18 per cent or about 2,000 passengers that first day. 11 
All of these measures are important, although be-
lated, recognition of the financial plight of the railroads 
and of the restrictions that such financial straits place 
upon the rails during this period of radical transportation 
changes. Other regulated industries can learn much from the 
railroads as to what must be done and what must be avoided 
in order to grow and change. For, without growth and 
change, ultimately there is no survival. 
10Ibid., October 5, 1962, P• 1 
Ibid., October 6, 1962, P• 1 
11rbid., January 10, 1963, P• 11 
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